Can Nonprofits Lead a Movement for Economic Justice?

CHAPTER 1

Chapter 1 of the book introduces the problem of widespread and growing poverty and inequality in US society and sets the stage for what might be done about it. Sociologists and political scientists suggest that civic participation is a place to start because it builds trust in a diverse society and the will to care for one's neighbor (Putnam 1993, 2000); teaches skills that can be deployed for political ends (Bagetta 2009, Clemens 2006); and by its local nature, generates better solutions tailored to the unique needs and preferences of particular communities and clients (Ganz 2009). Practically speaking, local charitable organizations might be just the place to start local efforts to address the systems that create poverty and inequality because, as collective action research suggests, they furnish both resources and people who care about the issue. In contrast to the idea that local organizations can support social change, conflicting theories about social change suggest that existing formal organizations are too bureaucratic and conservative to innovate in this way (Michels [1911] 1968, Piven and Cloward 1979, Kivel 2007). Thus, the study explores the conditions under which nonprofits can motivate their clients to build a grassroots base, innovate to combine the best elements of charity and community organizing, and benefit their clients using multiple strategies to achieve their mission.

I argue that the concept of a nonprofit is theoretically underdeveloped and that these organizations can be conceptualized along two continuums: the extent of their social change goals, community participation, and novel tactics which likens them to a social movement, and how much they resemble a formal organization with paid staff, steady funding streams, a long-term presence in the community, etc. Given that nonprofits represent a mix of these two types, analysis should draw on insights from both social movement literature and organizational theory.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

I present my own theory arguing that it is not their status as formal organizations that matters, but rather a nonprofit's culture that determines how well it can fight for systemic change. But, culture is created in the day–to–day interactions and structures provided by an organization. From this starting point, I introduce my case study of Sacred Heart Community Services (SHCS or Sacred Heart), a charitable organization that is trying to change internally by incorporating community organizing that will, in turn, advocate for systemic change. Next, I explain the methods with which I collect and analyze my data and outline the rest of the book.

CHAPTER 2

Chapter 2 draws mostly on social movement theory to discuss the importance of framing, that is, defining a problem and solution in ways that are credible to people who will comprise the grassroots base of collective action. Following Wright and Boudet (2012), I argue that personal experiences shape people's perceptions about an issue. In the case of poverty, I find this leads to very different analysis of the problem than is commonly understood in academic, policy, or middle class circles. Thus a nonprofit's connection with its clients may be conditional on whether staff have lived that experience or have deep relationships with clients so these experiences are clear. In the case of poverty, I show that the lack of money and resources especially enough to be self-sufficient does not resonate particularly well with low-income people. While they define poverty as a lack of housing, food, and clothes, this definition is so minimal that meeting this standard would not actually solve many of the problems clients of the

agency have. Among some, the resources necessary to be considered poor are so minimal that they argue nobody in the United States is actually experiencing poverty. Hence it would be extremely difficult to mobilize low-income people around this definition. I find that low-income people actually think of the problem as primarily being a lack of supportive social relationships. Framed in this way, it is possible to mobilize clients to participate in the activities of the agency and to begin to educate them about how to build support for their needs among powerful decision makers. Attracting people to participate in collective action is just a first step. In the following chapter I describe the challenges of incorporating a collective action strategy into a charitable organization.

CHAPTER 3: Challenges to combining organizing and charitable strategies to fight poverty

So far we have seen that experiences play an important role in how customers and staff at SHCS frame the problem of poverty and think about solutions to it. But for the past 30 years social movement research has suggested that appropriate framing to motivate people is not sufficient to generate collective action. As noted in Chapter 1, civic institutions like churches, universities, and nonprofits are viewed as important resources for community activism-providing access to a grassroots base, space to meet, and sometimes funding. Some scholars suggest that these organizations are usually too conservative to promote real change. Thus, the puzzle remains as to how organizations actually evolve to support and implement innovative approaches. How do different beliefs and values and organizational structures help or hinder development of a new approach?

To answer this question the ideal data set would provide sufficient detail about these factors (beliefs and values and structures) and compare across different attempts at implementation in order to draw conclusions about what works and what does not. Unfortunately, the literature on social movements rarely examines this micro-level phenomena. Typically, studies of social change and movement emergence examine vast geographical areas and time periods. The data is often collected post-facto limiting the ability to observe processes. Additionally, most studies are only able to examine one case which limits the ability to compare attempts. A lack of the right kind of data to explore this question has also resulted in a paucity of theory about these processes.

In the paragraphs below I solve these problems. First, I build a conceptual framework for thinking about SHCS's attempt at integrating grassroots organizing and social services as an example of true innovation. To do so, I draw on literature in organizational theory which is more concerned with firm level studies of innovation but typically examines for profit corporations, not nonprofits. I note that organizational theorists suggest that beliefs and values are crucial for legitimizing and reinforcing existing activities across different institutions or strategies. If this is the case how can they be combined? How does innovation and change ever occur? Next, using ethnographic and interview data from eight different observations of attempts to integrate organizing and social services at SHCS, I am able to compare the ways in which culture and structure influence the process of innovation.

I argue that to truly understand the process of innovation, one must examine different beliefs, values, and structures together rather than in isolation, which is the more traditional approach. It is not the mere presence of different beliefs and values that inevitably leads to either conflict or the creative tension necessary for innovation. Rather, it is the nature of how beliefs and values are understood and questioned, how structures nurture or hinder experimentation, and whether analysis of the experiments updates beliefs and values that determine whether recombination will occur. In the results section I develop propositions about how these different features matter for innovation and how they interact with one another.

For organizational leaders, the takeaway is that one must attend to beliefs and values and structures simultaneously or risk one of three potential failures: getting bogged down in ideological debate, failing to build a team capable of experimenting, or failing to collect data that could resolve disagreements based on beliefs and values and refine innovative approaches. The propositions ought to apply to all types of organizations, but I include a short discussion of how special features of nonprofit organizations may amplify the challenge.

FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT INNOVATION

Recombinant Innovation

It is widely understood that collective action for social change involves innovation. People begin to think in new ways, either no longer willing to accept injustices or newly willing to take risks to fight against them. They use new and innovative tactics to catch opponents off guard or gain the attention of decision makers and sympathy from the general public. They often bring new participants and stakeholders to the table and even create new organizations to deal with emerging issues or promote new philosophies. At Sacred Heart Community Services (SHCS), the innovation was to leverage the strengths of an existing, locally respected, social service agency to build a movement for economic justice. The purpose of this chapter is to present a framework for thinking about this type of innovation and the conditions under which it succeeds or fails.

SHCS's desire to combine grassroots organizing and charitable services and the cultures they represent can be thought of as a case of recombinant innovation. Recombinant innovation involves creating something new by selecting the best elements of two different strategies or technologies. A familiar example of this type of innovation is the automobile (example drawn from Fleming and Sorenson 2001:1020). It was the result of recombining elements of a train (combustion engine), a bicycle (gears), and a horse-drawn carriage (seating for a small group), in order to get a reliable, multi-speed, family-size vehicle. At SHCS the idea was to combine the sheer numbers of people accessing and volunteering in its charitable strategies with grassroots community organizing strategy to build a mass base of activists for economic justice.

Recombinant innovation can be especially challenging because finding the right combination of elements from different strategies is complicated by the number of elements in each strategy and the degree of interdependence of these elements (Fleming and Sorenson 2001). To illustrate, charity and grassroots organizing contain many different elements. People must be recruited, trained, organized into work teams, and encouraged to participate again. To varying degrees they must be educated about important issues, develop and/or follow rules to interact with one another, contribute as leaders, adopt certain attitudes, and learn to identify resources available at the agency or outside of it. Charity and community organizing each place varying degrees of emphasis on these elements and have different methods of ensuring they are present and functioning. One element of SHCS charitable activities was that they attracted and involved many volunteers and clients who are at least somewhat connected to the problem of poverty either because they are experiencing it or are driven to help alleviate it. Recruiting these types of people is an important element of community organizing. Thus, there is a possibility for combining these two elements by recruiting within a charity. However, another element of organizing that many people believe is important is empowering disadvantaged participants. In contrast, being a recipient of aid in a charitable setting may be associated with feelings of stigma, shame, or dependence. If this is true, the mindset with which someone approaches the task may be dependent on where he or she joins the cause. Being recruited at a charity may limit one's ability to be a powerful and confident leader on an organizing committee. Thus, recruiting for community organizing within the charity may prove unproductive. For recombinant innovation finding the right combination of various elements can present a major challenge. To find the optimal combination one might suspect an organization would go through a process that allows it to test specific combinations and evaluate the results.

Process of Innovation

The scientific method, shown in Figure 2 below, provides a framework for the process for innovation. First, people generate hypotheses, that is, specific and testable statements, about how elements of two strategies can recombine. For example, one possible hypothesis generated from the issue of recruiting and feelings of power described above might be: recruits into community organizing drawn from the food pantry recipients will not become powerful leaders. Indeed, this belief was common among organizing staff although it was never tested as a hypothesis for reasons that will be discussed below.

As noted above, experimentation or a sustained try at recombining elements of two or more strategies is critical for recombinant innovation. The most rigorous experiments include systematic data collection to prove or disprove a hypothesis. However, as I will show below, an experiment may or may not have well-articulated hypotheses or systematic data collection. While suboptimal, it is possible to analyze the effects of an experiment with respect to specific hypotheses about recombination after it occurs. An experiment testing the hypothesis stated above may simply involve a trial at recruiting community organizing participants at the pantry and then tracking whether they stay involved and behave in ways that denote their power such as speaking forcefully in a public forum, recruiting new participants, or planning events. Ideally, the organization would compare these outcomes to other forms of recruiting and try to keep other aspects of the organizing process relatively constant (e.g. the skills of the organizer, issue chosen, information conveyed, etc.) so that it can compare only on the basis of where participants were recruited, but this level of sophistication is not necessary, especially in the first trials at recombinant innovation.

The final step in the innovation process is analyzing the data. This is a crucial opportunity for organizational change. Reflecting on the experience of recombination should not only refine hypotheses for subsequent experiments, but perhaps challenge or change existing beliefs and values, making way for innovation. For example, if the experiment above showed that recruiting in the food pantry still resulted in powerful leaders then the opportunity to utilize the attraction of social services to build a mass grassroots base could be promising rather than rejected on the basis of beliefs about its feasibility. Of course, there might be some compromises regarding the power of leaders in this regard or in the way services are delivered. Recombinant innovation results in something fundamentally different. These breakthroughs are often the result of many trials, finding increasing returns to different combinations, and the willingness to take risks (Fleming 2007). Relative to tried-and-true methods that have proven effects, experimentation may feel particularly risky. It requires significant resources to plan, coordinate, collect data, and perform analysis. However, an investment in experimental experience, data, and analysis can help an organization make fact-based decisions about which innovations are most successful, refine hypotheses, and create new and effective strategies.

[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

CONTEXT OF INNOVATION – COMBINING INSTITUTIONS

The above discussion outlining the process of innovation makes it seem easy. But, true innovation is relatively rare both within organizations and through society via movements. Considering the context in which innovation occurs helps to identify potential challenges to, and facilitators of, change. Because Sacred Heart sought to recombine elements of two very different

institutions, those of charity and community organizing, to develop a framework for thinking about innovation one should consider elements of institutions.

Organizational theorists define institutions as "supraorganizational patterns of activity through which humans conduct their material life in time and space, *and* symbolic systems through which they categorize that activity and infuse it with meaning" (Friedland and Alford 1991:243, emphasis mine). Put another way, there is a relationship between processes (patterns of activity), structures (material life), and culture (beliefs and values). Charity and community organizing represent two different institutions usually found in separate organizations. Charity involves giving resources or services voluntarily to unrelated members of society in need. Charity tends to be driven by the desires and interests of the donor, and addresses immediate needs but does not aim to change a system that creates the problems of poverty and inequality. The main activity of community organizing is bringing disadvantaged people together to challenge decision makers to change systems that create disadvantage. Cooperation is critical because disadvantaged individuals may have few resources and little access or influence in decision making processes.

Culture Reinforces Structure and Activity

Institutional theorists as well as sociologists of culture recognize that these activities, "doing" charity or "doing" organizing, are not simply functional responses to inequality in society. They are social constructions, that is, the simultaneous result and reaffirmation of specific values and beliefs. Both of these institutions work on the problem of poverty, but each has different goals, activities, and institutional logics or values and beliefs that provide legitimacy to those goals and activities. Charitable activities are supported by and reaffirm beliefs about the virtues of altruism: meeting basic human needs, "loving thy neighbor," serving immediate needs, maximizing efficiency, and occasionally evaluating recipients' deservingness. Organizing is based on beliefs that power is unequally and unjustly distributed, that individuals affected by a problem should decide upon and work toward solutions, that long-term systemic change is desirable, and that democracy will be responsive to the power generated when many people gather together to advocate for a cause.

The legitimacy of activities, values, and beliefs is also reinforced by other powerful actors, like the government, and, in the case of nonprofits, donors and foundations. The idea is that organizations, all responding to similar demands and pressures, follow the edicts of powerful entities in an effort to gain and retain legitimacy. This legitimacy can garner resources like donations and grants or demonstrate adherence to laws and norms thereby avoiding sanctions. This shaping feature is so strong that organizations begin to look alike and congeal into "surpraorganizational" institutions.[1] Over time, institutional logics or beliefs and values prevalent in the institution and the activities they promote are taken for granted as right. In this formulation, beliefs and values or logics appear like a one-way channel determining the direction of people and their activities.

How Can Change Occur?

If doing an activity also justifies it and strengthens its moral, cultural, or ideological power causing most people to endorse doing it again, how can change occur? More specifically, how can two different institutions (in the case of SHCS, two separate strategies for fighting

[1] Organizational theorists refer to this phenomenon as "institutional isomorphism".

poverty), complete with different beliefs and values, structures, and processes recombine to create an innovative strategy?

Unfortunately, organizational theorists only rarely utilize the idea of institutional logics to examine change or innovation within any particular organization. Rather, much like social movement literature, this research usually examines fields of activity across many communities, and even nations, asking questions about the emergence of new sectors, organizational types, or industry practices. Those studies of innovation occurring at the organizational level most often focus on structure. Structures for innovation include teams with skills and time as well as space and resources to work with. Contemporary literature on innovation focuses mostly on the structural features of this process in corporate settings. Studies investigate what types of people identify promising opportunities, how they organize innovative teams, and where in an organization innovation should occur (Tripsas 2011).

Structure is one piece of the puzzle, but when innovation requires combining elements from separate institutions, like charity and community organizing, the role of culture may become even more salient. Indeed, research that examines innovative organizations that combine multiple institutions usually focuses on the role of culture or institutional logics. But they yield conflicting results and recommendations. At times findings suggest that the taken for-granted nature of institutional logics can result in conflict when two traditionally separate institutions are combined. For example, in a study of commercial micro-finance organizations Battilana and Dorado (2010) find that bankers and community development workers come into conflict about the primary goal of the organization and how to carry out its activities. The study suggests that logics are so deterministic that organizations need to focus on socializing team members so they have knowledge of both logics or hire people who don't know about either strategy and train them into a new culture supportive of the innovation.

While insightful about the challenges of implementing an innovation, this kind of study does little to explain how the innovation came about in the first place. It presumes that the best way to recombine elements of two institutions has already been discovered leaving little need for continued debate and expertise in either of the original strategies. I will argue below that the process of discovery of a recombinant innovation requires some amount of debate and expertise in multiple strategies.

Others warn of overstating the separation and potential for conflict among different institutional logics (Heimer 1999). Research of individual organizations suggests that institutional logics might not be as deterministic as often portrayed. In a study of a drug court, researchers found that if individuals can draw on multiple institutional logics, they can use them functionally and efficiently like tools to achieve rational ends (McPherson and Sauder 2013). In fact, many scholars of culture liken it to a tool kit (Swidler 1996). Movement studies imply that some activists who are deeply embedded in a community may indeed select different approaches like tools, using services as an entry point to discussing community organizing with potential recruits (Robnett 1996, Ganz 2009). Similarly, we know that entrepreneurs and inventors often have knowledge or understanding of multiple areas (Boh, Evaristo, and Ouderkirk 2014) or are part of networks providing a variety of skills, information, and expertise (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr 1996). This knowledge helps them to see the possibilities for trying new combinations. But, if logics were simply a tool, how and when they can be used should depend significantly on the processes and structures on which they can work.

ARGUMENT AND DATA

In this chapter I argue that to truly understand the process of innovation one must examine logics, structures, and processes together rather than in isolation. It is not the mere presence of different institutions that inevitably leads to either the conflict or creative tension necessary for innovation. Rather, it is the nature of how logics are understood and questioned, how structures nurture or hinder experimentation, and how the commitment to the innovative process drives analysis that determines whether innovation will occur.

I draw on ethnographic observations and interviews at Sacred Heart to develop propositions about what matters at each stage in the innovation process and how these features interact. Specifically, during my observation period at SHCS, discussions at management team meetings and strategic planning sessions often grappled with questions about how to integrate existing charitable service activities and community organizing. This paper draws on observations and interviews examining eight different organizing committees wherein recombinant innovation could have occurred, but exhibited varying degrees of success in the innovation process. Interviews and observations of meetings helped me to understand what was holding up progress through the innovation process represented in Figure 2.

While completing a cycle of the innovation process requires developing hypotheses, experimentation, and analysis, in the next section I will show that it is possible to experiment without ever developing hypotheses or to develop hypotheses but choose not to experiment. I will show that institutional logics were most central to the development of hypotheses while structures were most important for experimentation. I will also show how institutional logics influenced decisions about how to structure the innovation process while structure constrained the ability to develop clear hypotheses for experimentation. The propositions I develop have implications for recombinant innovation in many contexts, not just nonprofits. However, when I discuss analysis I will pay special attention to the way nonprofits might constrain the commitment to the innovation process critical at this phase.

RESULTS

Among the eight committee attempts at recombining the resources and strengths of a charitable organization and the systemic change goals of community organizing I observed five of six possible combinations in the innovation process shown in Table 1. If one considers each stage of the innovation process as completed or not, one might expect eight combinations (2^3). However, it is impossible to have analysis with no experimentation so two combinations are absent from the table: 1) having analysis with no hypothesis and no experiment and 2) having a hypothesis and analysis but no experiment. In the next section, drawing on examples from committees representing each different combination, I develop propositions explaining how the nature of beliefs and values and structures influenced the ability of a committee to successfully innovate.

Hypothesis Development

Committees could develop hypotheses or not. The citizenship committee was most successful at articulating a clear hypothesis. The organizer of this committee, Jesús, was hired to do both community organizing and help clients file applications for citizenship. Coming from a mixed status family, he appreciated the value of citizenship services. Based on his prior experience working in Washington, DC on immigration issues he also appreciated community organizing because he believed that local demand is necessary for political change if the

immigration issue was ever going to be resolved. Over time, Jesús also learned the core activities, values, beliefs, and assumptions of each strategy. He noted that providing services as a caseworker filling out citizenship paperwork was efficient but did not develop the relationships and political consciousness necessary for organizing. Comparing the two strategies he told me,

> As a caseworker you are very mechanical. You just check off the boxes, gather the facts, identify the issues, and gather the evidence. So there's no relationship. You know? I don't know anything about them, they don't know anything about me. As a caseworker people show up and they sit down in front of you and they just expect to be asked questions about their history and why they came into the country when they got their green card so they're coming to the table knowing they're going to get service. Right? I'm here and this person is gonna help me get service and a lot of that [attitude] is [from] just years of conditioning, going to institutions-the way you're treated at the DMV or to go get your food stamps, whatever. They're conditioned in a certain way to show up and ask, "Can [you] help me out? I'm here to get this help right? And I'm really hoping that I do" … they have the self-interest where it's just about checking off the box... So then as an organizer, it's hard to ignore all that because you're supposed to get all that done, checking all the boxes… It's a completely different mindset as an organizer… you want to sit there and you really want to like dig deep about what's moving this person. What's motivating this person [to] act? Is this person angry about injustice? It's just very different mindsets.

Although Jesús recognized the two strategies were different, he continued to try to integrate them. He believed he couldn't organize people who weren't angry about injustice, so he figured he would need to identify those people. Jesús hypothesized that approaching people about organizing first then providing them with services in return for their participation would be an effective way of recruiting leaders into the organizing work. Because he needed to determine how motivated potential clients were, he experimented with engaging clients in deeper conversations about their motivations and experiences as immigrants before providing services. After this conversation, if a client seemed like she could be recruited for organizing he offered to help her with her citizenship application in return for her participation on an organizing committee. Those who were not good candidates for organizing were referred to other agencies providing citizenship services but without the goal of building a grassroots base.

To be clear, this method for recruiting leaders and providing services did not perfectly fit either the community organizing or service logic at Sacred Heart. On the one hand, community organizers were frequently told not to help people access services. This was because it reinforced a relationship of dependency rather than empowerment. On the social services side, the agency prided itself on providing assistance with no strings attached. Thus, asking people to participate in a different program in order to access the citizenship assistance was a major departure from beliefs and values about determining eligibility.

Jesús arrived at this hypothesis not by valuing one strategy more than the other, or by separating his two duties, but rather by actively engaging with the two institutions and questioning how they might be combined. This was a year-long learning process "of writing and reading and thinking about how to identify people who will be good leaders." Jesús explained:

> So in the beginning it took me a while, it took me a good year, to work through that and realize that I needed to do the organizing interview first, pick out the people who I thought were, who would be great, who really had some fire in them to change and were politicized. And then once I identified that, have the second interview with them to do the casework. Then every time we met there was maintenance: we talked about the case, we checked off some boxes, got some evidence, but most of the conversation would be, "what did you think about that last organizing meeting?" Evaluation. So once I got the hang of it I was able to create a check, but the organizing came first [in order for it to be effective?] Yeah.

Jesús's appreciation of both service delivery and organizing derived from his own personal experiences. His understanding of the two respective institutional logics, his willingness to grapple with them, and make compromises in each of them resulted in the development of a clear and testable hypothesis: Approaching people about organizing first, then providing them with services in return for their participation would be an effective way of recruiting leaders into the organizing work. This case suggests that:

> **Proposition 1+:** *Appreciation and active questioning of multiple logics, often derived from analysis of experiences or data, generates testable hypotheses.*

However, as I learned from observing hypothesis development, this understanding and appreciation for both strategies while actively questioning how they might combine was not always present in the organizer or organizing team leading a committee. On the other end of the spectrum, many committees did not develop hypotheses involving recombinant innovation at all. Two mechanisms involving logics accounted for this outcome. Organizers working only with the Policy and Organizing department (PAO) had many beliefs and values about organizing and charitable services but never questioned how the strategies might recombine.

The organizing logic is shaped by a deep criticism of existing power relations. More than one organizer viewed services as reinforcing that unequal balance of power. Speaking about the potential of including volunteers in organizing rather than focusing only on low-income clients, Will, a 25-year-old organizer explained,

> For a lot of volunteers, it's not a power orientation. It's like, I'm here to help, but it's not about power. It's about giving back. [For them] social justice is about crumbs, right? [They're ok with giving the poor] the crumbs that fall off the pie as opposed to a bigger piece of the pie, or as opposed to throwing it out the window and making a cake. There's whole different ways [of thinking about solving poverty].

In recognizing that the two strategies were based on vastly different beliefs, values, and goals some of the organizing staff didn't trust that volunteers and staff in service delivery positions would commit to and carry out important organizing values. For example, focused on her commitment to empower disadvantaged populations another organizer felt that it was most important to let disadvantaged people have decision-making power, but she didn't think other staff were convinced and noted, "There are many different ways to fake [organizing in a service agency]." Relatedly, in focusing on empowering the disadvantaged, some organizers believed

that a committee could not be comprised of disadvantaged people and more advantaged volunteers and staff because they would drown out the voices and opinions of the disadvantaged. They hesitated to recruit clients of the agency, because, much like Jesús noted, they felt receiving services did not make disadvantaged people feel powerful.

With little acknowledgment of the benefits of services, and a strong commitment to the organizing logic, bolstered by advice given by other organizers outside the agency, the team worked separately to establish a strong process and train new organizers apart from the influence of the charitable side of the agency. Much of the committee work took on the appearance of a separate nonprofit utilizing the funding sources and legitimacy of the larger agency but not focused on recombinant innovation by exploiting the potential for recruiting in the agency or collaboration with other staff. This suggests that:

> **Proposition 1a-:** *Strong allegiance to a single institutional logic, usually based on ideological commitment rather than analysis of data or experience, hinders development of hypotheses about recombinant innovation.*

There were other committees with the potential for testing important hypotheses about recombinant innovation that also failed to develop those hypotheses. Unlike the PAO committees, these committees suffered from being too open to the various logics. So open, in fact, that instead of questioning the logics they never discussed them at all. For example, management constantly discussed and debated how the agency could exploit the strengths and commitment of volunteers and staff for community organizing work. As noted above, some staff thought that combining volunteers and disadvantaged clients in a single committee would be detrimental to the power and leadership development of disadvantaged groups. Another common debate was about who should choose the issue. Staff often had more knowledge about political opportunities and extensive networks for potential collaboration that would make organizing more effective. On the other hand, proponents of empowering disadvantaged groups felt that utilizing this strength of the agency could undermine the independence and learning process of low-income, less educated, or less connected leaders new to organizing work. The Sacred Heart Housing Action Committee (SHHAC) could have tested both of these hypotheses.

SHHAC was launched on the basis of the Executive Director's[2] knowledge of the details of government spending on housing first developed when he served as a leader of a large local agency working on homelessness. On the tails of advocacy work, mostly performed by volunteers on a local minimum wage campaign, the Executive Director approached a staff person in the volunteer office about starting a volunteer committee to advocate for a permanent source of affordable housing funding. The money could come from unrestricted funds that the city council and the county were receiving in the wake of the closure of redevelopment offices across the state. By all accounts a strong commitment to a pure organizing logic would have caused the organizing department to reject such a strategy since the issue was chosen by someone with considerable power rather than the committee members. In fact, this was precisely why PAO didn't work on the minimum wage campaign. Thus, the Executive Director and staff from the volunteer office created a committee by sending a general call to volunteers. However, at their first meeting a homeless couple and several working class volunteers struggling with housing affordability attended.

[2] An Executive Director is the commonly used title in the nonprofit sector for the CEO position

A committee was born combining three groups: staff, volunteers, and low-income clients, but hypotheses about how they would work together were never developed. Had a more skeptical organizer from PAO been involved, he or she may have raised the question. Most people on the committee were simply focused on the possibility of winning on another big issue much like they had on minimum wage. Their beliefs and values generating openness to grassroots organizing (to be clear, this was not a staff run advocacy campaign) *and* utilizing volunteers traditionally working in services hindered the questioning necessary to develop hypotheses about recombinant innovation.

The La Mesa Verde (LMV) and Familias Unidas (FamU) committees also failed to articulate clear hypotheses. The goal of these committees was to function like a more traditional community organizing model by bringing together community members to pick an issue. The hope however was to use the relationships created by service provision to recruit members of the committee. LMV was originally started in order to teach low-income families how to garden and thereby have access to more fresh and healthy food. The program was charitable insofar as garden supplies and classes were given for free. But, over time the families were expected to volunteer to help the program install gardens, organize classes, and later run a program for graduates of the first year who wanted more education. Ultimately, the program recruited a manager who had a strong social justice orientation and saw "food and politics as inseparable." The plan was that with her help they could innovate by bringing organizing into LMV and helping participants advocate for more systemic changes around food access. For example, it was often noted that not every family would be able to have a thriving garden. Therefore, fixing school lunches or promoting the development of healthy and affordable food vendors in the neighborhood would help a much broader range of people. Similarly, FamU was an educational program intended to teach parents how the school system works and how to advocate within it. Unlike LMV, it was developed specifically with collective action in mind. In explaining its origins, the director of the education department said that she thought it could be utilized to get:

> … people to think about and at least talk about with other parents about the concept of parental involvement in the school system not just for your kid but because its fucked up, the whole system is fucked up for all kids. What happens when you have your next kid, or your comadres[3] kid? All these kids are tracked this way on purpose. How is funding coming into your school compared to the school on the other side of town that is in the same school district? So how can we lead them through a dialogue on those issues so they can choose to be involved in something deeper or not?

In both cases the will to innovate was there. Creating a committee from the participants in these programs could have been the opportunity to test hypotheses about the potential for recruiting service users into community organizing much like Jesús did with the citizenship program. However, while there was appreciation of both approaches, there was little active questioning of how the two logics could fit together. The experiences of SHHAC, LMV, and FamU suggest:

[3] Comadre is a Spanish term used to reference a close female friend who is also a mother. Sometimes the reference is specifically referring to a godmother-the godmother of one's child or your godchild's mother.

Proposition 1b-: *Appreciation and a lack of active questioning of multiple logics hinder hypothesis development.*

In sum, it appears as though multiple institutional logics can facilitate or hinder the development of hypotheses about recombinant innovation. It is not the fact that they exist in an organization, but rather the extent to which a team or individual appreciates and questions those logics that seems to matter. Questioning is critical. As many committees demonstrated, having too much allegiance to one logic or being too open to both logics can hinder the development and articulation of hypotheses. But, this leads to yet another issue-if questioning is critical, what kinds of circumstances allow for it and result in experiments recombining various elements of two strategies?

Experimentation

As exemplified by the PAO committees, being especially closed to one of the logics or strategies results in no hypotheses and little experimentation. Because of their distrust and lack of appreciation for services, the PAO team chose to structure their activities in isolation from the rest of the agency rather than experimenting with recombining elements of both strategies. Other committees, like SHHAC, LMV, and FamU also failed to articulate hypotheses about recombinant innovation but still experimented with it to varying levels of success. I'll argue in this section that the critical feature at the experimental phase is logistical coordination dependent on the structures that support that coordination. As noted above, structures include the spaces, skills, time, and physical resources necessary for experiments to take place. By contrasting the way experiments unfolded, I'll develop propositions about how the nature of structures supports or hinders experimentation.

I found that the key structural features of experimentation for recombinant innovation were the skills and autonomy of the staff assigned to the task. Successful committees in this regard had staff assigned to them that brought detailed knowledge of the logics and, perhaps more importantly at this phase, controlled the activities of each strategy. This knowledge could be present in the same person or on a team that collaborated closely together. For example, Jesús was in charge of both the service and organizing elements related to the citizenship committee. He saw firsthand how each worked and how elements could be recombined to meet the goals of both. He was relatively autonomous in his decision making about how to recombine these elements as long as his work showed results. The time pressures on him seemed to reinforce the need to combine the work rather than attempt to perform two separate jobs in the guise of one staff member. This is illustrated by Jesús's explanation:

> I had two supervisors for most of it until I started complaining... I can't have two supervisors, you know, it's just like doing two jobs… They were both under the assumption that I was doing 50-50 but it was more like doing two jobs simultaneously [so doing almost 2 full-time jobs simultaneously?] Yeah that's what it felt like. First when they told me what I was supposed to be doing whatever the job description that they drafted was I was like, "yeah that's not gonna work." For me it was just like, "how can you successfully divide [the work]?" First of all I was on salaries so it's supposed to be a 40 hour kind of deal but it ended up being 50 hours a week. I usually spent, honestly I spent 75% of my time organizing and 25% of doing citizenship.

Jesús points out a key tension resolved by recombinant innovation when he asks, "how can you successfully divide?" The point of this kind of innovation is not to divide one person between two strategies but to create a new strategy. Prior research suggests this innovation is most successful when employees are fully dedicated to the task and assigned to a work group that is independent of existing departments or business units (Martin and Eisenhardt 2010). As Jesús pushed back on his supervisors he essentially shifted from doing two jobs for two different departments to doing one job that resulted in recombinant innovation by including elements of each strategy.

The other possibility was having a team that brought different types of skills to the table but worked closely together. SHHAC exemplified this model. By including the Executive Director it benefitted from long-held experience in community organizing and local political knowledge. By including staff from the community engagement team it benefitted from deep experience coordinating volunteers and the relationships that stemmed from that. Low-income, homeless, and people struggling with affordable housing contributed labor but also powerful personal experiences and testimonies during political action. While these staff were also pressed for time, their knowledge of, and commitment to both strategies seemed to fuel the motivation to take part. Eventually, one of the community engagement staff took on responsibility for SHHAC as part of his job description (much like Jesús) rather than playing dual roles in two different departments.

> **Proposition 2a+:** *Structures that promote collaboration and autonomy by people with hands-on knowledge of both strategies facilitate experimentation.*

In contrast, the experiences with LMV and FamU were quite different. Staff from these programs and the organizing department assigned to the innovation task did not collaborate together in an autonomous format. The managers of both LMV and FamU were supervised by the director of the education department, while the organizers assigned were supervised by the organizing director. Unlike Jesús, who spent over a year grappling with how best to deliver services and organize the community, the managers and organizers looked to these directors for guidance. For example, when asked about her goals after about two months on the job, , Elizabeth, the community organizer assigned to work with LMV, told her supervisors and the executive director, that she "just wanted to work," but it seemed like the two teams weren't "on each other's side" and it wasn't coming about organically. Elizabeth wondered why they were always in meetings when they "could be out working." The conviction that she shouldn't be in meetings demonstrates that the structures for collaboration, active questioning about recombination, and experimentation simply weren't present even though the motivation to innovate was.

This collaborative time was needed because unlike SHHAC and the citizenship committee, staff members did not know the day-to-day activities and beliefs of one another's strategies. For example, an argument ensued when an organizer characterized LMV as an education program. The director of education replied that it was not an "education" program, rather, "we are trying to have a food sovereign community." This aspect of community building was central to LMV and could have been utilized by organizing to build a committee. This potential was evident to people who had experience with both teams. For example, in

comparing the manager of LMV and the PAO director, an LMV client who had first learned of SHCS through community organizing efforts explained that the two were pretty much the same:

> I'm confused about why [LMV and PAO] have such a difficult time getting together [and collaborating]… The organizing director is more aggressive… she wants to grab the system by the balls and make it scream (laughter) she wants us to get out there and challenge everything that is going on around us… Whereas LMV is the same thing but more laid-back, more hippie-ish… more gentle. It's still radical... What they've both done is reigned in their powerfulness and taught us enough so that we can grow at our own pace.

This quote emphasizes that the two teams didn't necessarily have different goals or logics, but because they lacked collaboration they did not recognize it in one another and could not figure out how to best combine the strengths of each of the programs. To be clear, the lack of collaboration may have stemmed from the fact that the PAO director was mostly unreceptive to the idea of recombination. Ironically, she seemed to become more defensive of a pure organizing logic and strategy as other staff members expressed openness and flexibility to the idea of making compromises in the effort to recombine.

Without this collaboration, attempts at recombining organizing and these charitable, educational activities did not take the form of true experiments exploiting the strengths of each strategy. Instead of working together to deliver services and recruit for organizing in tandem the way Jesús and SHHAC had, LMV and FamU participants were approached by organizers separately. LMV and FamU handed off contact information and the organizers "cold-called" participants to set up one-on-one meetings to gauge their interest in organizing. This method failed to capitalize on the strong, positive relationships LMV staff had already built with participants, relationships that are often considered a prerequisite for successful organizing. The separation created confusion among clients who didn't see how organizing fit with the program they had signed up for. Neither program was able to build a committee during the year I observed the experiment.

> **Proposition 2a-:** *Structures that do not generate collaboration and autonomy by people with hands-on knowledge of both strategies hinder experimentation.*

The other structural element most important for these experiments was resources. In particular because not everyone who gets approached about organizing will be interested, having a large pool of potential leaders is very advantageous. Indeed this was a major part of the motivation for combining services and organizing. For the citizenship committee and SHHAC the key resource was the almost endless supply of potential recruits. In Jesús's experiment with the citizenship committee dozens and dozens of people wanted help gaining citizenship, far more than he could serve. This allowed Jesús to experiment with eligibility by screening people on the basis of how much they wanted to work for the deeper systemic change that was also central to his mission. Had there not been much interest in the citizenship services, he would have been resource-constrained, unable to set parameters for who could and could not receive the benefit based on participation in organizing activities. Similarly, with more than 10,000 volunteers each year, finding a dozen or so to participate in organizing around affordable housing, a central issue in Silicon Valley, didn't present a threat to volunteer recruitment for the charitable work.

Proposition 2b+: *Structures that can draw on abundant resources facilitate experimentation.*

If we can consider participants as a resource for both efforts, the fact that conflict arose between LMVand FamU, and the process of organizing is natural. While the LMV staff had strong relationships with its participants, recruiting enough people for the program and retaining their participation was often a challenge. The potential of turning off or confusing dedicated participants by engaging them in community organizing was a risk staff did not want to take and was demonstrated when the LMV team hesitated to share its participant rosters and contact info with the organizing team. This threat was confirmed in meetings with LMV participants who had begun to take on more serious leadership roles in the program. One of their central preoccupations was that the expectations of the program were very clear and that other participants were held accountable to those expectations. By introducing organizing midway, clarity and accountability were compromised. Ironically, accountability is also central to organizing work and could have been a lever for combining the two programs. But the way the collaboration was structured was not conducive to sharing this detailed information and there was no staff member with hands-on knowledge of both programs. Similarly, FamU also had a limited supply of participants and difficulty recruiting more. This was partly an issue of time-the director of FamU started the program at the very same time he got promoted to a management position in which his day-to-day responsibilities were expanded. His inability to focus on recruitment made the job difficult for the organizer assigned to the group. With less than a dozen participants to talk with, she couldn't build the committee as quickly as she felt was required to by the organizing department.

Proposition 2b-: *Structures that can have access to very limited resources hinder experimentation.*

These cases suggest that structure is critically important at the experimentation stage. Staff must not only be motivated to innovate but also have the means to do so. This includes hands-on knowledge of the elements of both strategies either present in an individual or through collaboration and sufficient resources to experiment with various models.

It is important to note that logics have an impact on structure. Because creating a structure of collaboration is resource intensive, it is almost impossible to imagine that an organization would risk those resources without a strong belief that recombination is the best way to go about the work. For example, although the director of the food pantry often thought about how his staff could connect the masses of volunteers and clients coming through his program to the organizing work, the volume of work his staff faced seemed to make this impossible. The staff constantly managed the flow of food and people, both which needed immediate attention to avoid spoiled food and long lines which were considered prohibitively burdensome. This limited their ability to build the relationships necessary for referral to other programs. But few staff would have been comfortable scaling down the numbers served. Most staff continuously expressed the belief that providing for basic needs was critically important-the first stage of intervention in eliminating poverty. Only one staff member, an organizer, mentioned the possibility of scaling back the numbers of people served in order to make space for innovation in the program. But this was seen as a demonstration of her lack of commitment

to service and not as an actual possibility. This demonstrates how logics and structure are linked. To invest in the structures that make experimentation possible, one must appreciate and understand both sets of beliefs and values. This usually comes from experiences of the benefits of both strategies. In the case of recruiting in the pantry neither director had these direct experiences.

Analysis of Experiments at SHCS

As is evident in Table 1, I almost never observed analysis of the experiments conducted toward the goal of recombinant innovation. To conduct analysis, there must be a self-conscious acknowledgement and commitment to the process of innovation. This is because the best analysis requires clear articulation of hypotheses at the beginning and data collection based on those hypotheses at the experimental stage. It is possible to analyze an experiment after the fact, reflecting back on an experience to gather data, but this is still only possible if hypotheses are articulated and connected to the experience.

Throughout the committees there was the potential to develop hypotheses about how strategies might be recombined to utilize the best features of both. I argue that the way in which institutional logics are used is central to the development of clear, testable hypotheses. When people appreciate, understand, and question both logics, they are most likely to develop testable hypotheses. However, if they ignore logics or reject them, hypotheses are not articulated. If they have little knowledge of how two strategies work hypotheses are more like guesses than well-informed statements driving tests. I've also shown that hypotheses do not always lead to well-developed experiments and experiments can occur without clearly articulated hypotheses. This is because structures – spaces for collaboration, autonomy, and resources – that allow an organization to toy with the recombination of elements are most important for experimentation. Recombinant innovation can seem inefficient at first. Therefore allocating resources toward these structures feels risky at the experimental stage. To create the right structures one must be quite committed to the process of innovation, like when Jesús was hired to do both service and organizing work and committed himself to doing them simultaneously rather than simply working two different jobs.

In the cases where experiments occurred but analysis did not, I found two problems. First, recall that the openness to logics in the SHHAC committee resulted in little critical questioning of them and the subsequent failure to articulate testable hypotheses. For example, the idea that clients' participation and leadership development would be hindered by a committee with more privileged members could have been tested. The team could have developed a leadership evaluation, administered it at intervals, and compared the results with the same evaluation of disadvantaged clients on committees involving only disadvantaged people. This kind of data was not collected in a rigorous fashion and we couldn't expect it to be without a clear hypothesis.

Proposition 3a-: *Lack of clearly articulated hypotheses precludes analysis of experiments*.

Second, in the citizenship committee case clear hypotheses and experiments were conducted. Furthermore, the organizing team could have easily compared the rate of growth and leadership on the citizenship committee to that of a committee also organized by Jesús but using door knocking as the recruitment strategy to test whether combining services and organizing was fruitful. However, as Jesús told me, he was never invited to share what he had learned. This was more of a problem with the structure of analysis–usually occurring at the senior level with little

input from the "experimenters" themselves. Comparing door knocking to organizing in a service context Jesús said,

> I knew this was an experiment. It was kind of fun. I was like, "Well there's no expectation here, what's gonna happen? (Laughter)." Once I figured that out I was happy. I was like, "Why didn't you just tell me that in the beginning? Everybody acts like they know what they're doing. Why don't you just sit me down and say, 'We don't know what we're doing. Let's just do the best we can and figure this out together.'?" It would've been a lot better than saying, "… all this is what you're supposed to do and you have to have seven committees." This is just ridiculous. You're not going to have seven committees. That's never gonna happen. That was a lot of my frustration. Can the leadership be transparent about what we're trying to do here? There was none of that. We were in the dark about a lot of the decisions made by the executive director and director of the organizing program. They had their conversations and then they came out of that with the plan and said you guys go and execute… It would've been really helpful to us to say "Why don't we all sit down and figure out what we have on the table and what we can do?" instead of saying, "This is the way we understand things to be and this is what you're supposed to do."

It appears that the management didn't clearly articulate to organizers that their job was to experiment and they were central to the experimentation process. Jesús figured it out partly because the structure of his job allowed space for the experiment, but in other cases, the structure of collaboration and the resources available did not facilitate an experimental process.

Ironically, analysis did occur to some extent in the less successful experiments conducted by LMV and FamU. This appears to be motivated by the fact that the experiments were failing to produce acceptable organizing outcomes. But, for analysis to work, what is also needed is comparison to similar attempts with different outcomes. Had the LMV and FamU teams been able to compare Jesús's citizenship committee experience with their own experiences they may have been able to more functionally solve the problem or generate a new experiment. However, this was not what happened. For example, when it was determined that cold-calling didn't work, the LMV manager was tasked with developing a new experiment. But she didn't have any data about what may work and was not collaborating on this with the director of PAO who may have had the information since Jesús had already left the agency for a different job. The point is that the people with the data, that is, the experimenters themselves, were rarely at the table when analysis occurred suggesting that:

> **Proposition 3b-:** *Lack of commitment to the innovation process by excluding experimenters and data holders hinders analysis of experiments.*

Before passing too much judgment, it is worth noting that many of the experiments Sacred Heart conducted were successful. Organizers created committees, recruited community members who became leaders on those committees, and won benefits for the community. The issue was that after so many experiments, logics, rather than data, dominated strategic discussions about how to move forward and structure the agency. High level conversations by senior management and the board of directors weren't influenced by the informal learning that

had occurred. This resulted in frustration and uncertainty that may have been avoided. Thus, ideally, analysis would occur.

Analysis and innovation in the nonprofit setting

It's worth questioning whether asking for this type of sophisticated analysis is fair in the nonprofit setting. Indeed, there are many features of the nonprofit world that do not support the process of innovation. I've suggested above that analysis might be useful in helping people to update the logics that justify existing strategies in favor of innovation. But, this may be too optimistic. One thing that makes nonprofits distinctive is the expressive opportunity they provide for people that participate within them (Frumkin 2002). This is not to say that corporate activity is unexpressive, but rather, that organizations may exist on a continuum regarding the centrality of personal values as work is carried out. In the nonprofit sector, because volunteers give their time for free and professionals are often paid less than in other sectors (Mirvis and Hackett 1983, Borgaza and Tortia 2006), working in accordance with one's values may be a major form of compensation. Benz (2005) finds that nonprofit workers are more satisfied than for profit workers controlling for wages, hours worked, an array of fringe benefits, and personality differences. Therefore, it is quite easy to continue with a strategy or justify one to others because "it is the right thing to do" regardless of its efficacy.

Fascinatingly, polls showed that this "right thing to do" argument for an increase in minimum wage in the city was the most effective among potential voters. Thus, while it is rare, though not unheard of, in a corporate setting to continue to offer a product that is losing money because "it's the right thing to do," the expressive feature of civil society (both nonprofits and political movements) makes this argument acceptable and discourages data collection and analysis. Indeed, several theorists suggest that this is why nonprofits exist in the first place–to do work that is not widely demanded or valued by the broader society (Hansman 2006). In some sense what may look like failure in this setting can be interpreted as the challenge of doing the right thing in a society that does not understand or accept that approach. Thus, if organizing was shown to be slow, arduous, or inefficient it is not automatically the case that it would be interpreted as a failure. A case can be made that it is the right and only truly effective way of changing the world over the long term.

Second, unless they have a research purpose, very few nonprofits' structures are conducive to the innovation process. They do not have staff focused on developing and conducting experiments. There are no Research & Development (R&D) departments. Indeed, until now, almost all studies on innovation have occurred in corporations, often examining R&D activities and outcomes. While funders today do pressure nonprofits to measure outcomes and often provide technical or capacity building support to collect outcome data, they do not necessarily promote risk-taking or continuous work on projects that appear, initially, to be failures. This combined with the fact that many nonprofit outcomes are difficult to measure, especially those that attempt to change people or society hinders the motivation to risk innovation in the first place, but also to spend money on sophisticated analyses. For example, even if an organization could show that a client escaped poverty or was involved in a campaign to raise the minimum wage, proving that their organization was responsible for the change is very difficult.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this paper is to show that at different stages of the innovation process organizations should attend to different features of institutions while understanding that they also interact. Table 2 summarizes the propositions with respect to the process of innovation and the institutional features that I argue matter most at each stage.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

At the hypothesis development stage the beliefs and values or institutional logics must be understood and actively questioned. Jesús was able to do this for the citizenship committee because he valued both logics and was tasked with both activities. SHHAC failed to articulate hypotheses because, while the staff valued both logics, they were too open, resulting in an experimental trial but none of the skepticism necessary for hypothesis development. PAO committees also failed to develop hypotheses. But it was because staff were too closed to the benefits of the service logic and too committed to the assumptions and beliefs of organizing. The interaction between logics and structure occurs in the fact that the appreciation and knowledge about logics stemmed directly from personal, hands-on experiences with the strategies.

At the experimentation phase structures are critically important. I show that in some cases experiments with recombinant innovation occurred without hypotheses. This happened when the skills, resources, and knowledge of elements of both strategies were present on the team and could be experimented with. Without these structures in place, attempts at integrating organizing and services did not represent true recombinant innovation; they did not preserve the strengths of both strategies. The interaction between logics and structure was evident at this phase precisely because they could support the risky investment necessary to run an experiment. When staff believed in the value of recombining strategies experiments occurred. For example SHHAC went ahead and organized volunteers alongside low-income clients even though organizing staff may have hesitated in doing so. Jesús compromised traditional ways of selecting people for services and recruiting people for organizing in order to innovate. When staff did not appreciate the other logic or were unwilling to compromise on their own–such as the case of potentially organizing in the pantry–no investment in experimentation occurred.

At the analysis phase, commitment to the innovation process was most important. I observed very little analysis of experiments since the data had not been collected because hypotheses were never articulated or because the people with the data were not at the table during analysis. These are examples of the failure to put structures in place supporting data collection for analysis. This failure may be particular to nonprofits. As I explained in more detail above, nonprofits have staff with expertise on the strategies of charity and organizing but typically do not have expertise about the innovation process. Their resources constrain the ability to hire or develop such structures. Logics also may interact with the process of innovation. Specifically, the fact that nonprofits are locations for more personal expression of beliefs and values may hinder the willingness to accept data and analysis as a justification for innovation that will require compromises to existing strategies. Put another way, when a strategy is just "the right thing to do," it may be pursued in spite of results or analysis supporting other strategies.

These general findings suggest that in accounting for innovation, researchers cannot examine only institutional logics or only structures. These features matter at different points in

the process and interact together. Since the relatively few observations I had limited the variation I observed, future research should test these emergent propositions in larger samples.

The implications for practitioners seeking to innovate are perhaps more helpful. The findings suggest that debates about how strategies can be recombined are useful but only insofar as they generate testable hypotheses. People with hands-on knowledge of how strategies are implemented must be at the table during these debates to brainstorm concrete ways of recombining strategies. If debates are too hypothetical, the expressive features of a nonprofit and different beliefs and values associated with diverse institutions may lead to an endless meeting rather than hypotheses and experiments related to recombining those institutions. At the experimental phase logics may be placed on the back burner.

Organizations should focus on creating structures with adequate resources and a wide variety of skills and information necessary to play with recombination and collect data on the hypotheses different logics inspired. Finally, at the analysis phase, people must stay committed to the innovation process. When a compromise on one strategy seems to be yielding acceptable results they must be willing to update their logics, that is, their commitments to specific values and beliefs. When failure occurs, they must be willing to view that as learning and develop a new hypothesis and experiment, especially given the fact that recombinant innovation can be particularly complex.

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Figure 1: Nonprofits conceptualized on two continua–social change goals and formality of the organization

Figure 2: The process of innovation



Table 1: Possible combinations of steps in the innovation process

Hypothesis developed?	Experiment conducted?	Analysis?	Committee
Yes	Yes	No	Citizenship
No	No	No	PAO
No	Yes	No	SHHAC, USAC, VAC[†]
No	Yes	Yes	LMV, FamU
Yes	No	No	Pantry
Yes	Yes	Yes	*Not observed*

[†] USA is the United Seniors Action Committee and VAC is the Volunteer Action Committee. Like SHHAC, both groups attempted to do community organizing with mixed or novel populations and exhibited very similar patterns as SHHAC – focusing more on doing the innovative work but not on the hypothesis or analysis phases

Table 2: Summary of propositions about logics, structures, processes, and special features of nonprofits in relation to the innovation process–hypothesis development, experimentation, and analysis

Hypotheses?	Logics matter	Experiment?	Structures matter	Analysis?	Process matters
Yes	**Proposition 1+:** *Appreciation and active questioning of multiple logics, often derived from analysis of experiences or data, generates testable hypotheses.*	Yes	**Proposition 2a+:** *Structures that promote collaboration and autonomy by people with hands-on knowledge of both strategies facilitate experimentation.* **Proposition 2b+:** *Structures that can draw on abundant resources facilitate experimentation.*	Yes	
No	**Proposition 1a-:** *Strong allegiance to a single institutional logic, usually based on ideological commitment rather than analysis of data or experience, hinders development of hypotheses about recombinant innovation.* **Proposition 1b-:** *Appreciation and a lack of active questioning of multiple logics hinder hypothesis development.*	No	**Proposition 2a-:** *Structures that do not generate collaboration and autonomy by people with hands-on knowledge of both strategies hinder experimentation.* **Proposition 2b-:** *Structures that have access to very limited resources hinder experimentation.*	No	**Proposition 3a-:** *Lack of clearly articulated hypotheses precludes analysis of experiments.* **Proposition 3b-:** *Lack of commitment to the innovation process by excluding experimenters and data holders hinders analysis of experiments.*
Special features of nonprofits					
The expressive nature of nonprofits may make commitment to the beliefs and values which influence institutional logics especially strong. If this is the case, accepting data and experiences to update logics may prove challenging.		Nonprofits do not traditionally have R&D departments and spare resources to spend on experimentation. Resource dependency on donors that are risk-averse and focused on outcomes rather than processes may hinder experimentation.		Nonprofit outcomes tend to be particularly difficult to measure. This is especially the case when nonprofits seek to change people, like leadership development, or society, like community activism, rather than simply manipulate things.	